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This paper studies the effect of employment protection on worker productivity and firm output in the
context of a public school system. In 2004, the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) and Chicago Teachers
Union (CTU) signed a new collective bargaining agreement that gave principals the flexibility to dismiss
probationary teachers (defined as those with less than five years of experience) for any reason, and
without the elaborate documentation and hearing process typical in many large, urban school districts.
Results suggest that the policy reduced annual teacher absences by roughly 10 percent and reduced
the prevalence of teachers with 15 or more annual absences by 20 percent. The effects were strongest
among teachers in elementary schools and in low-achieving, predominantly African-American high
schools, and among teachers with highpredicted absences. There is also evidence that the impact of
the policy increased substantially after its first year.
Brian A. Jacob
Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy
University of Michigan
735 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
and NBER
bajacob@umich.edu2 
“What kind of person could you get to run a small business if you told them that when they came 
in they couldn't get rid of people that they thought weren't any good?”  
 




1.  Introduction  
Economists have long argued that the lack of incentives in most public school systems 
substantially reduces student performance and increases the cost of education (Hanushek 1994; 
Hoxby 2003).  Teacher employment and compensation policy is one of the most commonly cited 
instances of weak incentives leading to suboptimal outcomes. As reflected in the quote by Steve 
Jobs, labor contracts in most public school districts make it extremely difficult for administrators 
to dismiss teachers for cause.  In New York City, for example, only about 50 out of roughly 
75,000 teachers were dismissed for performance-related reasons in recent years.
1  
Recent “value-added” studies on teacher effectiveness documenting substantial variation 
in teacher effectiveness both within and between schools (e.g., Steven G. Rivkin, et al., 2005, 
Jonah E. Rockoff, 2004) have intensified the scrutiny of teacher hiring, promotion and 
compensation policies.
2  Many school districts have begun to experiment with pay-for-
performance plans, and there is increasing discussion of ways to change to the teacher tenure 
system that would provide school administrators with greater flexibility over staffing.  The 
Chancellor of the Washington, D.C. public schools, for example, recently proposed to substitute 
                                                 
1 Personal communication with Jonah Rockoff, February 19, 2008.  
2 In general, variance estimates indicate that a student with a teacher one standard deviation above the mean would 
score roughly .2 student-level standard deviations higher on standardized math exams.  The magnitude of this effect 
is roughly equivalent to the effect of class size reduction found in the highly acclaimed Tennessee STAR class size 
reduction experiment, although it should be noted that recent evidence suggests that the impact of having a 
particularly effective (or ineffective) teacher as measured by value-added fades out considerably within a year or 
two (see, for example, Jacob et al. Forthcoming).  
 3 
higher teacher salaries in exchange for a suspension of tenure privileges for one year (Haynes 
2008). 
And, yet, there is little empirical evidence on whether such incentives will change teacher 
behavior or improve student achievement.  Evidence on merit pay is mixed (Springer and 
Podgursky 2008, Lavy 2008).  There is some evidence that school accountability can improve 
student achievement, but these policies (including the federal No Child Left Behind program) 
provide few direct incentives for teachers as they do not change teacher compensation and 
teachers’ job security is still (mostly) guaranteed by collective bargaining agreements.  To the 
best of my knowledge, there is no direct evidence whatsoever on whether policies such as those 
commonly cited by observers such as Steve Jobs – namely those that reduce employment 
protections for teachers – will actually improve productivity.  Indeed, several recent reports 
document that existing teacher contracts in many large urban school districts actually provide 
considerably more flexibility than is commonly believed and yet administrators rarely take 
advantage of such flexibility (Ballou 2000, Hess and Loup 2008, Price 2009).      
In this paper, I take advantage of a unique policy change to examine how the reduction of 
employment protection for teachers impacts teacher effort and student achievement.  In 2004, the 
Chicago Public Schools (CPS) and Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) signed a new collective 
bargaining agreement that gave principals the flexibility to dismiss probationary teachers for any 
reason, and without the documentation and hearing process that is typically required for teacher 
dismissals.  In practice, this dramatically reduced the costs associated with firing young teachers 
in the district.
3   
                                                 
3 An informal survey of the 10 largest school districts in the country revealed that principals in these districts do not 
have the flexibility that Chicago principals were recently granted.  4 
To identify the impact of the policy on teacher effort, I utilize a difference-in-difference 
estimator that compares changes in teacher absences before and after the policy for probationary 
versus tenured teachers.  As described in more detail below, employee absences have been used 
in studies of employment protection in other industries, and provide a particularly good proxy for 
productivity in education.  The results suggest that the policy reduced annual teacher absences by 
roughly 10 percent and reduced the prevalence of teachers with 15 or more annual absences by 
20 percent.  The effects were strongest among teachers in elementary schools and in low-
achieving, predominantly African-American high schools, and among teachers with high-
predicted absences.  
While student achievement is a more direct measure of teacher productivity, it is not 
possible to link students to teachers in Chicago over the relevant time period, making it 
impossible to calculate individual teacher productivity measures.
4   For this reason, I rely on 
school-year data to examine the impact of the policy change on student achievement, comparing 
within-school changes in student achievement over time between schools with higher versus 
lower fractions of probationary teachers at the time the policy was implemented.
5  I find some 
tentative evidence that the policy increased student achievement at the elementary level, 
although the results are not particularly robust.  Additionally, I find that the effects on teacher 
absences likely explain only a small part of the achievement effects, suggesting that the policy 
may have impacted teacher behavior in many ways.     
                                                 
4 Moreover, even in the best circumstance, a measure of teacher productivity based on student achievement would 
not be available for the large fraction of teachers in grades and subjects where students do not take standardized 
exams. 
5 While average teacher experience in a school is correlated with student achievement and socioeconomic status, I 
show that there is substantial variation in the fraction of probationary teachers across observationally similar 
schools.  Moreover, by examining within-school changes over time, I can control for any unobservable time-
invariant characteristics of schools that might be associated with initial teacher experience levels and subsequent 
student achievement (e.g., a particularly dangerous neighborhood, aging school facilities). 5 
This study makes several important contributions.  First, it informs the economic 
literatures on employment protection policies and teacher incentives.  To the best of my 
knowledge, it is one of the few empirical studies of the impact of employment protection on 
worker effort, and the only study to directly examine this issue in the public sector.  By using 
detailed administrative data that provides employee- and firm-level productivity measures, and 
exploiting a plausibly exogenous source of variation in employment protection, the analysis here 
provides among the most compelling evidence on these important issues.  Second, the findings 
presented here have important implications for current education policy debates.  Specifically, 
the decline in teacher absenteeism following the introduction of the policy provides the most 
compelling evidence to date that changes in teacher contract provisions can improve student 
achievement.   
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews the prior literature on 
employment protection and teacher incentives. Section 3 provides background on teacher 
dismissals in the Chicago Public Schools, and outlines a conceptual framework to help 
understand the ways in which the policy might influence teacher effort and school productivity.  
Sections IV and V describe the empirical strategy and data respectively.  Section VI presents the 
results, and Section VII concludes.  
 
2. Prior Evidence 
The analysis in this paper speaks most directly to the economics literature on 
employment protection.  Most previous research in this area focuses on how employment 
protection can inhibit a firm from adjusting in response to economic shocks or changes in 
technology and examines outcomes such as worker mobility and employment levels (Bertola 6 
1990; Lazear 1990; Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993).
6  However, firms may also want to 
dismiss workers because of poor performance, in which case one would be concerned with the 
impact of employment protections on worker effort and firm productivity.    
Surprisingly few studies have examined the impact of employment protection on worker 
behavior.  In the study most closely related to our analysis, Ichino and Riphahn (2004) use 
detailed personnel data from an Italian Bank to examine whether worker absenteeism changes 
after the three-month mark, when bank employees are granted tenure.  Looking at changes in 
absenteeism within employers over time, the authors find that when men get tenure their absence 
rate more than triples.  Interestingly, they find no comparable effect for women.   
Martins (2009) examines the impact of legislation that restricted firings for cause in 
Portugal, using a difference-in-difference approach that exploits the fact that many provisions of 
the law did not apply to small firms.  While he does not find any robust effects on job or worker 
flows, the author does find that small firms experienced sizeable increases in their performance 
(as measured by sales per worker) relative to large firms after the introduction of the legislation.  
The author finds no evidence of either capital deepening or observable changes in worker 
composition in small firms, leading him to conclude that the effect is driven by increases in 
worker effort and/or changes in management practices.   
Several other studies examine the effects on worker behavior less directly.  For example, 
a related line of research examines the impact of wrongful discharge laws in the United States.
7  
                                                 
6 While employment protection should unambiguously reduce job flows, in many models the theoretical impact of 
employment protection on employment levels is ambiguous, as higher firing costs reduce both firing and hiring 
(Bertola 1992).  Recent research using worker- or firm-level data show is mixed, although there is some evidence 
that commonly adopted employment protection may reduce job mobility and employment (for important recent 
papers in this literature, see Kugler 1999, Hunt 2000, Bauer et al. 2007, Friesen 2005, Kugler and Pica 2007, Autor 
et al. 2006, Marinescu 2009). 
7 In a series of more recent papers, Autor et al. (2004, 2006 and 2007) reconcile the conflicting findings from prior 
research and find evidence that one wrongful-discharge provision (i.e., the implied-contract exception) reduced 7 
Using the variation in dismissal costs generated by the adoption of wrongful-discharge protection 
by state courts, Autor et al. (2007) find that one of three main wrongful-discharge provisions, the 
good-faith exception, seems to decrease total factor productivity.  However, the authors caution 
that this result is not particularly robust, in part because the good-faith exception does not seem 
to impact employment or wages.  Indeed, the one provision that the authors find does impact 
employment, the implied-contract exception, does not seem to impact productivity.
8  
This paper also speaks to the growing literature on teacher incentives, a line of research 
that fits within the broader work on employee incentives within the personnel economics 
literature (see Pendergast 1999 for a review of the literature on employee incentives).  Research 
on teacher incentives has focused on two types of policies that arguably provide enhanced 
incentives for teacher performance:  merit pay or other compensation schemes that link pay to 
student performance, and school accountability policies that tie rewards or sanctions to student 
performance.  Two recent reviews of pay-for-performance in education conclude that the 
existing evidence on merit pay is limited and shows mixed results (Springer and Podgursky 
2008, Lavy 2008).  There is some compelling evidence that well-structured teacher incentives 
can substantially improve student performance, but this research comes from developing 
countries like Kenya and India and may not generalize well to schooling in developed countries.
9   
                                                                                                                                                             
employment rates, but that the two other major provisions (i.e., the public-policy and good-faith exceptions) had no 
robust employment or wage effects. 
8 Using similar variation as Autor et al. (2006), Bird and Knopf (2009) find that wrongful discharge protections 
increased labor expenses and reduced profitability in the commercial banking sector and Petrin and Sivadasan 
(2006) find that employment protection increased the gap between marginal revenue product and wages. Besley and 
Burgess (2004) find that Indian states that reformed laws in a pro-worker direction experienced lower output, 
employment, investment and productivity in the formal sector, as Ill as an increase in urban poverty. 
9 While pay-for-performance has been around for many years in public education, it has received increasing 
attention in recent years.  This has led to a dramatic increase in the number of districts experimenting with some 
form of merit pay, and to more research on the impact of such policies.  Several ongoing studies, including a random 
assignment evaluation in Nashville, TN, promise to shed more light on the prospects for merit pay in education. 
 8 
In the area of school accountability, some evidence suggests that policies that link 
consequential sanctions to student performance do improve student achievement, particularly in 
math (Jacob 2005, Hanushek and Raymond 2005).  Similarly, Dee and Jacob (2009) find that the 
federal No Child Left Behind legislation increased math performance.  On the other hand, there 
is evidence that such accountability policies often lead to unintended, negative consequences 
(Jacob 2005, Figlio and Winick 2005, Neal and Schanzenbach 2009).  Furthermore, school 
accountability policies, including the federal No Child Left Behind Act, provide no direct 
incentives for teachers and thus do not provide a compelling test of the type of employment 
protection policies studied here.  
Finally, a recent paper provides evidence that teachers respond to the implicit incentives 
generated by career concerns.  Using data on public school teachers in North Carolina, Hansen 
(2009a) finds that teacher absences are positively correlated with both experience and tenure in a 
particular school, and absences increase dramatically in the year prior teacher retirement or 
departure.  While this study sheds light on teacher incentives broadly, it does not speak directly 
to the potential impact of a change in teacher tenure policy. 
 
3. Background  
 
3.1 Teacher Dismissal Policy in the Chicago Public Schools 
As in many public school districts, teacher layoffs and dismissals in the Chicago Public 
Schools are highly regulated.  In situations where teacher positions must be eliminated due to 
enrollment changes or a budget shortfall, the collective bargaining agreement outlines a 9 
procedure by which the least experienced teachers are let go first.  This is typically known as a 
reduction-in-force (RIF).  
In the past, it has been extremely difficult for principals to dismiss teachers outside the 
auspices of a RIF.  Like most other districts, the collective bargaining agreement in Chicago 
provides considerable protection for tenured teachers that make it very time-consuming and 
difficult for principals to dismiss these teachers for cause. Unlike many smaller, suburban 
districts in Illinois, however, the collective bargaining agreement in Chicago also made it very 
difficult for principals to dismiss non-tenured teachers. Perhaps for this reason, formal principal 
evaluations in Chicago are remarkably generous.  In 2007, for example, only 15 out of the 
11,621 teachers who were evaluated in 2007 received a rating of unsatisfactory, and only 641 out 
of 11,621 (roughly 5.5 percent) received a rating of satisfactory.  The remaining teachers were 
rated excellent or superior.  
The adoption of a new collective bargaining agreement on July 1, 2004 made substantial 
changes to the tenure system in Chicago that, for the first time in the 2004-05 school year, 
provided principals with the ability to easily dismiss non-tenured teachers.  So, in the analysis 
that follows, the academic years 2001-02 through 2003-04 constitute the “pre-policy” period and 
the academic years 2004-05 through 2006-07 constitute the “post-policy” period.  The July 2004 
contract created a new three-tiered classification system for Chicago teachers: (1) Temporarily 
Assigned Teachers (TATs) include individuals who are in a temporary placement (such as a 
long-term substitute who is filling in for a teacher on leave) and are not earning tenure; (2) 
Probationary Appointed Teachers (PATs) include individuals who have been regularly appointed 
to a position but have been teaching for fewer than five consecutive years (i.e., during this 
period, Chicago teachers received tenure after four years of service) and; (3) tenured teachers.  10 
Non-renewal works in the following way.  Each February, principals are able to log into a 
district computer system that has a list of all of the PATs in their school.  The principal can then 
check one of two boxes: renew or non-renew.
10  The administrative ease with which 
administrators can dismiss a probationary teacher – with a simple “click” of a button – is 
noteworthy.  In essence, the collective bargaining agreement adopted in July 2004 dramatically 
reduced the costs of firing a probationary teacher in the district.  This policy change made 
Chicago the only large, public school district in the country to provide principals with this type 
of flexibility over personnel decisions.
11 
Teachers are notified by formal letter of non-renewal sometime in late April or early 
May.  If a principal chooses to non-renew a teacher, the teacher is guaranteed health benefits 
through August 31
st of the current year, and is allowed to reapply to positions in other Chicago 
public schools.  Moreover, the teacher is eligible for unemployment benefits as non-renewal is 
viewed as a layoff rather than a dismissal for cause.
12  However, non-renewed teachers are not 
guaranteed another job in the CPS.
13  Although principals are required to provide district 
                                                 
10 If the principal checks the “non-renewal” box, he or she must check indicate at least one of the following five 
reasons for the non-renewal: deficiencies with instruction (e.g., planning, methods, subject matter knowledge), 
deficiencies with environment (e.g., classroom management, teacher-pupil relationships), deficiencies with 
professional and personal responsibilities (e.g., attendance, tardiness, professional judgment), deficiencies with 
communication (e.g., parent conference skills, relations with staff), or deficiencies with attitude (e.g., lack of 
cooperation, lack of respect for others). 
11 Principals are not required to make any decision for a particular teacher.  If a principal either chooses to renew a 
PAT or takes no action, then the teacher is still eligible to be laid off through the standard RIF process. 
12 PATs who are rehired by November 1
st will not experience a break in service for tenure purposes.   
13 PATs who are displaced through the standard RIF process are also guaranteed health benefits through August 31
st 
and eligible for unemployment insurance.  However, they are also guaranteed a position as a cadre teacher, which 
means that they are guaranteed work as a substitute every day and receive a higher rate of pay and better benefits 
than a day-to-day substitute.  In contrast, non-renewed teachers have to apply to be a cadre teacher, and are accepted 
on a case-by-case basis after displaced PATs.  Tenured teachers who are displaced through the RIF process receive 
even more benefits. Personal communication with Nancy Slavin, Director of Teacher Recruitment, Chicago Public 
Schools, June 22, 2007.  11 
officials with at least one reason for the non-renewal decision, they are not required to justify or 
explain their decision and they do not need to provide teachers with this reason.
14  
 
3.2 Conceptual Framework 
A simple economic model suggests that the reduction in firing costs could influence 
worker effort and productivity
15 in one of two primary ways:  by changing the behavior of 
existing workers and/or by changing the composition of workers in the firm.  For many workers, 
lower firing costs will induce greater effort by creating a stronger link between job performance 
and continued employment.  Lower firing costs could also change the composition of workers in 
the firm.  If the effort required to avoid dismissal is sufficiently costly for a particular employee, 
for example, the policy might induce her to quit.  Perhaps more importantly, the reduction in 
firing costs will likely lead the firm to dismiss a larger fraction of workers.   
The impact of such compositional changes on worker productivity depends on a variety 
of factors including the principal preferences (e.g., the type of teacher the principal chooses to 
dismiss and the type hired as the replacement) and the elasticity of supply for teacher quality.
16  
If teachers dismiss probationary teachers with below average productivity, supply is relatively 
inelastic, and principals do not change their hiring behavior, then one would expect the average 
productivity in the school to rise over time.
17 
                                                 
14 If a principal chooses to non-renew a PAT in his or her fourth year (that is, immediately prior to tenure), the 
principal is required to inform the teacher which reason(s) were listed, but is not required to further justify or explain 
the decision.  
15 I use the term effort and productivity interchangeably in this discussion. 
16 In other work, I estimate the relative weight that school administrators place on a variety of teacher characteristics 
in making dismissal decisions (Jacob 2009).  I find principals are significantly more likely to dismiss teachers who 
are frequently absent, have received poor evaluations in the past and are less effective at raising student 
achievement, all of which suggests potential composition effects.  
17 The policy might also impact worker productivity by altering hiring practices in other ways.  The ability to easily 
dismiss probationary teachers essentially decreases the cost of hiring a new teacher if one considers the expected 
difficulty of dismissing an ineffective teacher as part of the cost.  All else equal, this will increase a principal’s 12 
There are several other potential channels through which a reduction in firing costs 
among a subset of teacher might influence teacher productivity.  First, the policy might also 
operate through spillovers from probationary to tenured teachers.  To the extent that there are 
substantial complementarities across teachers within the same school, the policy might increase 
the productivity of tenured teachers who were not directly affected by the renewal policy.  If, for 
example, the three 5
th grade teachers in a particular school work together to plan activities, 
greater effort and commitment on the part of the one probationary teacher could benefit the two 
tenured teachers (Jackson and Bruegmann 2009).
18 
Second, the reduction in firing costs may lead to a change in management practices 
(Martins 2009).   For example, the policy may induce school principals to adjust aspects of the 
school organization, curriculum or pedagogy.  Based on my informal interviews with several 
principals and discussions with central office personnel, this does not appear to have occurred 
much, if at all.  Finally, the policy could impact productivity by influencing teacher supply more 
generally.  The introduction of the renewal policy increased the risk associated with a new 
teaching position in the CPS.  In the absence of any increase in financial compensation, the 
policy will make teaching positions in the CPS less attractive for risk-averse individuals, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
likelihood of hiring a “higher-risk” teacher – that is, a teacher about whom the principal has less information with 
regard to job performance.  For example, the introduction of the renewal policy might make principals more inclined 
to hire teachers with alternative certification, or individuals entering teaching as a second career.  Assuming that 
principals are risk-averse in their hiring practices, this might increase the overall productivity of the teacher 
workforce.  Moreover, to the extent that principals differ in their ability to identify effective teachers (pre- or post-
hire), this policy might exacerbate across-school differences in teacher quality. 
18 Autor (2003) notes that employment protection policies may reduce the incentive of employees to invest in firm-
specific skills, which could lower productivity.  13 
will tend to shift the supply curve inward.
19  In practice, however, this does not seem to have 
happened in Chicago.
20   
  
3.3 Some Basic Facts about Teacher Dismissals  
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the prevalence of teacher dismissal under this 
new policy.  Several interesting facts stand out.  First, while roughly 10-13 percent of 
probationary teachers were dismissed each year under the new policy, 30-40 of schools did not 
dismiss any teachers.  This did not change dramatically between 2005 and 2007.  Younger 
probationary teachers were substantially more likely to be dismissed than others, consistent with 
the idea that principals learn the most about a new teacher in his or her first year.   
While there was a positive correlation between low student performance and the 
prevalence of teacher dismissal in a school, it was not merely high-performing schools that failed 
to dismiss any of their teachers.  In 2005, 65 percent of schools in the lowest quartile of student 
achievement in the district dismissed at least one teacher compared with 46 percent of the 
highest-achieving schools in the district.  Splits using school value-added measures yield 
comparable results.   
In other work, I show that once one controls for teacher background characteristics, 
factors such as school achievement level and racial composition of the school are not correlated 
with the school’s dismissal rate (Jacob 2007).  Indeed, a rich set of observable teacher, school 
                                                 
19 Note that this could influence teacher supply decisions with regard to accepting a position in the CPS initially as 
well as continuing to teach in the CPS in subsequent years. 
20 Based on my conversations with district officials and a review of teacher application files over this period, it 
appears that neither the number of applicants per available position nor the observable characteristics of applicants 
changed noticeably after the introduction of the policy.  Moreover, the number of voluntary exits among new 
teachers has not increased in recent years, although this statistic may be misleading if, prior to the policy, a larger 
fraction of the officially voluntary exits were actually “encouraged” on the part of school administrators.  
Unfortunately, there is no way to distinguish truly voluntary versus involuntary exits prior to the introduction of the 
policy. 14 
and principal characteristics explain less than 10 percent of the variation in teacher dismissal 
under the new policy.  This suggests that there was considerable variation across principals in the 
willingness to utilize this particular policy lever.  
Finally, it is worth noting that in any given year, over half of the dismissed teachers were 
rehired the following year by another school in the district.  For example, 50.6% of first-year 
probationary teachers who were dismissed in Spring 2005 were rehired by a CPS school in Fall 
2005.  Among third- and fourth-year probationary teachers who were dismissed, the rate was 
over 60%.   Given the fact that at least some of the dismissals under the policy were the result of 
position cuts, in which case the teacher’s former principal may have provided the teacher with a 
good recommendation, it is not surprising that some fraction of dismissed teachers were rehired.  
However, it is also likely that some fraction of teachers dismissed due to poor performance were 
also rehired by other CPS schools.  It is not clear why principals would rehire teachers who had 
been dismissed from a different school for performance reasons.  Non-renewal decisions are not 
made public to all principals in the district, but a hiring principal could almost certainly get this 
information by contacting the candidate’s former principal.  
These statistics seem to suggest that the introduction of the dismissal policy had a large 
impact on job separations in the district.  However, the numbers of teachers who were non-
renewed in any given year likely overstates the impact of the policy because a number of young 
teachers would likely have left the CPS in the absence of the policy, either voluntarily or due to 
subtle “encouragement” on the part of the principals.  If the dismissal policy merely formalized 
previously informal dismissals, then one would not necessarily expect to find a substantial 
change in separations.  Even in this case, however, the policy may have influenced teacher 
productivity if it changed the expectation or transparency of the dismissal process.   15 
To shed light on these issues, Table 2 presents statistics on teacher mobility before and 
after the implementation of the non-renewal policy.  In the years prior to the introduction of the 
policy, roughly 10-15 percent of first-year teachers probationary teachers left the CPS and an 
additional 4 percent moved to a different CPS school.  In the years after the policy, the 
corresponding rates were roughly 18 and 10 percent respectively.  Comparing the year 
immediately prior to the policy (2004) with the first two years of the policy (2005 and 2006), the 
separation rate increased by roughly 9 percentage points (10 percent) in years immediately 
following the policy.  In contrast, there was virtually no change among more experienced 
teachers (i.e., those with 6-15 years of experience) who were not subject to the policy.
21   In 
summary, the dismissal policy appears to have had at least a modest impact on teacher 




4. Empirical Strategy 
To estimate the impact of the policy on teacher productivity, I utilize a simple difference-
in-difference (DD) estimator that compares changes in absence rates between teachers who were 
subject to the policy and those who were not.  The control group in the baseline analysis consists 
of all tenured teachers, although I later show that our results are robust to other plausible control 
                                                 
21 Interestingly, I see a quite different pattern among temporary teachers.  The separation rates for this group appears 
to have decreased following the introduction of the policy.  It is not clear what might explain this pattern among 
temporary teachers, except that perhaps principals may have kept temporary teachers in part to replace the 
probationary teachers that they were able to dismiss. 
22 An alternate strategy for estimating the fraction of dismissed teachers who would not have left voluntarily is to 
compare the separation rates of renewed vs. non-renewed teachers under the new policy.  Among those first-year 
teachers in 2004-05 who were renewed, only 89 percent were teaching in the CPS in the following year (and 11 
percent left voluntarily).  In comparison, 56 percent of first-year teachers who were not renewed in 2004-05 ended 
up teaching in the CPS in the following year. Assuming that 11 percent of the non-renewed teachers would have left 
voluntarily as was the case with the renewed teachers, I can calculate that 75 percent [(.44-.11)/(.44) = .75 ] of the 
separations among non-renewed teachers were involuntary; or rather, would not have occurred in the absence of the 
policy.  16 
groups (e.g., only young, tenured teachers).  I include both probationary and temporary teachers 
as treatment groups.  As described above, probationary teachers were directly affected by the 
policy.  Temporary teachers include individuals who are not fully credentialed and were (in 
theory) easier to dismiss even before the introduction of the new policy.  Under the new policy, 
they are first in line for layoffs and easier to dismiss than PATs or tenured teachers.  Given that 
most temporary teachers hope to become probationary teachers, it seems likely that the dismissal 
policy may have influenced their behavior as well.  For this reason, I include temporary teachers 
in our analysis but allow the policy to have a differential impact on this group relative to 
probationary teachers. 
For the baseline specification, I estimate the following regression via OLS: 
 (1)  , 
where Aiset , refers to the number of absences of teacher i in school s with experience e (e.g., first-
year teacher, second-year teacher, etc.) in year t.  As described below, the data includes 
information on teachers from 2003-04 through 2006-07.  The variable post is an indicator that 
takes on the value of one in years following the introduction of the policy (i.e., 2005-2007).  The 
variables PAT and TAT are binary indicators for probationary and temporary teachers 
respectively.  Tenured teachers are the omitted category.  Note that these job status variables are 
time varying indicators so, for example, an individual teacher may appear as a PAT in one year 
and a tenured teacher in subsequent years.
23   
                                                 
23 One might be concerned about including probationary teachers who became tenured under the new policy.  By 
definition, these teachers were not dismissed, and thus presumably have higher productivity than the average teacher 
from the same cohort.  By including the post-tenure observations for these “survivors” in the analysis, one may be 
inflating the productivity of the control group in later years.  I later show that, in practice, the exclusion of these 
teacher-year observations does not substantially change our estimates.  Hence, for simplicity, I include them in the 
baseline specification.   17 
In all models, I also include time (i.e., academic year) fixed effects denoted by  , school 
fixed effects denoted by , and a full set of teacher experience indicators denoted by Exp.  In 
some specifications, I also include teacher characteristics (X) and school-year characteristics (Z) 
as well.  In equation (1), the coefficients on the interaction between PAT/TAT and post,  and 
, measure the net effect of the policy.   
As noted above, the policy can operate through both incentive and compositional effects.  
Ideally, one would like to be able to separate these components.  One potential approach is to 
focus on within-teacher variation by estimating a variant of equation (1) that includes teacher 
fixed effects.
24  While this approach will eliminate any compositional effects, it will only identify 
the policy impact for a select group of teachers.  Specifically, the teacher fixed effect model will 
not capture the policy effect for teachers hired in 2005 or later because, by construction, I will 
not observe these teachers under both regimes.  If there were homogeneous incentive effects, this 
would not be a problem.  But if the incentive effects of the policy were largest on these young, 
newly hired teachers, which seems likely, then the estimates from a teacher fixed effect model 
could be a misleading estimate of the average treatment effect.       
More generally, if the incentive effects vary by calendar year and/or experience level, it 
will not be possible to cleanly separate the incentive and composition effects.  Unfortunately, this 
also seems quite likely to be the case.  For example, incentive effects may have been larger after 
the first year of the policy, when teachers realized that there was a non-trivial chance of being 
dismissed.  Similarly, incentive effects may have been smaller for teachers who had “survived” 
dismissal in prior years.  I present effects separately by the calendar year and a teacher’s risk 
                                                 
24 In addition to focusing exclusively on the incentive effects, this approach allows one to rule out potential 
confounders related to composition changes such as an unrelated influx of high quality individuals from other 
occupations spurred by a weak local economy. 18 
year (defined below), which shed some light on incentive and composition effects even if they do 
not perfectly distinguish the two.  
 
5. Data 
The data for this study comes from several sources.  Teacher personnel files provide 
information on teacher background, current assignment and renewal decisions. I supplement this 
teacher-level data with information on school demographics, principal characteristics from 
personnel files, and student test score information. 
 
5.1 Determining job status 
To determine a teacher’s job status, I rely on administrative teacher assignment data 
provided by the CPS.  Starting in 2004-05, district files clearly identify whether a teacher is a 
temporary, probationary or tenured teacher.  In earlier years, temporary teachers are clearly 
identified but the district did not utilize a comparable classification system for teachers for other 
teachers, so I determine job status using other information.  During the Spring/Summer of 2004, 
the district conducted a thorough audit of all teachers in the system to determine which were to 
be assigned probationary status for the 2004-05 school year.  In doing so, this data provides a 
teacher’s status in 2003-04.  For teachers who were teaching in the district in 2003-04 (or later 
years), I use their later job status to impute their job status as of 2002-03. For example, if an 
individual was a second year probationary teacher in 2003-04, I consider them a first year 
probationary teacher in 2002-03.  If a teacher were tenured in 2003-04, then I assume that they 
were also tenured in 2002-03 if they also had at least 5 years of experience as of 2002-03.  If the 
teacher had fewer than 5 years of experience in 2002-03, I consider this teacher probationary.  19 
For teachers who left the system after 2002-03, I utilize a combination of experience and 
assignment to determine job status. Specifically, if the individual had at least 5 years of 
experience and was assigned to a position (as opposed to filling the position of another teacher 
on leave, for example), then I consider the individual to be tenured.  While this process is 
necessarily imperfect, I believe that it is accurate for the vast majority of teachers and any 
remaining measurement error should simply lead to attenuation of the policy effect.     
There is one final complication regarding job status that is worth noting.  Before the 
introduction of the non-renewal policy, there was a category of teachers who were fully 
credentialed, but not formally appointed to a position (i.e., not on the “tenure track”).  These 
unassigned teachers composed roughly one-quarter of all probationary teachers in 2003-04.  
When the policy was implemented in 2004-05, all of these previously “unassigned” teachers 
were formally appointed.  At this point, they became first-year probationary teachers regardless 
of the number of years they had been working as in the CPS.  Hence, there is a wide range of 
experience among PATs (as with TATs and tenured teachers).  While these teachers were similar 
to the appointed, non-tenured teachers prior to the introduction of the new policy in the sense 
that both were, in theory, more easily dismissed than their tenured colleagues, there were also 
important differences between the two groups.  In practice, assigned teachers had more job 
security than their unassigned colleagues.  I include both unassigned and assigned teachers in the 
baseline specifications (along with a full set of experience controls), and later present estimates 
that focus on each group individually.   
 20 
5.2 Measures of teacher productivity  
Teacher absence data from payroll records serve as our primary measure of teacher 
productivity.  This measure is appealing for several reasons.  First, absences are measured 
extremely well in the payroll data and they are easily interpretable.  Second, teacher absences 
impose substantial financial costs on the district, which has to pay for substitute teachers, as well 
as non-pecuniary costs on school administrators and other teachers who must juggle schedules to 
accommodate an absent colleague.  Third, several recent studies have documented that teacher 
absences have a strong, negative association with student achievement, providing evidence that 
this association is causal (Clotfelter et al. 2007, Miller et al. 2007).
25  Indeed, in other work using 
Chicago data from a similar time period, I show that a teacher’s absences are negatively 
associated with principal evaluations of the teacher and with a teacher’s value-added contribution 
to student achievement (Jacob and Walsh 2009).  Finally, there is considerable evidence that 
absences are at least partly discretionary.  Research suggests that teacher absences are more 
frequent on Mondays and Fridays (ERS 1980), higher among temporary teachers and correlated 
with more general shirking in the workplace (Bradley et al. 2007) and negatively associated with 
buy-back provisions that allow teachers to receive payment for unused absences (Ehrenberg et al. 
1991).  Hansen (2009a) finds that teacher absences in NC correspond to experience, tenure in a 
school, the presence of a new principal and proximity to retirement in ways that would suggest 
absences are a good proxy for discretionary effort.   
                                                 
25 Using North Carolina data, Clotfelter et al. (2007) employ teacher fixed effects and find that each 10 days of 
teacher absences decrease student achievement by 2.6 percent of a standard deviation.  Miller et al. (2007, 
forthcoming) focus on one disadvantaged urban district and also use teacher fixed effects.  They find that each 10 
days of teacher absences reduce students’ mathematics achievement by 3.3 percent of a standard deviation.  In the 
context of a developing economy, Duflo and Hanna (2006) provide experimental evidence that teacher absences 
reduce student performance.   21 
Teachers in Chicago are allotted 10-12 paid sick or personal days per year.  Teachers can 
accumulate unused sick days across years, up to a maximum of 315 days.  These days can be 
cashed in upon leaving the district at a rate of 100% for those teachers retiring with at least 40 
years of experience and at a 90% rate for teachers with 20-40 years of experience. In addition, 
teachers get 3 personal days per year, which can be used for emergencies, religious holidays or 
personal business. There are some restrictions regarding the use of personal days (e.g., teachers 
cannot use all three days in succession and they cannot be used in the first or last week of school, 
or on a day before or after a holiday), although unused personal days get banked as sick days.
26 
The primary outcome measure is simply the total number of days that each teacher was 
absent during the academic year, which generally runs from the beginning of September through 
mid-June, excluding “excused absences” for professional development or other sanctioned 
activities.
27  I also present results using indicators for frequent and/or inappropriate absences as 
the outcome (e.g., indicator for 15+ absences during the year, number of absences on Fridays, or 
fraction of total absences on Mondays or Fridays, etc.).  
Table 3 presents summary statistics on the final sample of 33,600 teachers over 5 years 
(117,420 teacher-year observations). Looking down column 1, one sees that roughly 77 percent 
of teachers are women, 48 percent are white, 35 percent are Black and 14 percent are Hispanic.  
The average age is 44 years, but 25 percent of teachers are less than 33 years old.  Over 50 
percent of teachers received a BA in education, and 16 percent of teachers in the sample had 
                                                 
26 Information on teacher absence policy comes from a review of the recent CPS teacher collective bargaining 
agreements.  Teachers with 13+ years of experience are entitled to 11 paid sick/personal days per year and (as of 
2008) teachers with 18+ years of experience are entitled to 12 paid days.  Starting in 2009, teachers were allowed to 
accumulate up to 320 days of sick leave across years.  Teachers who retire at age 65 or older they would get to cash 
in 85% of their sick days.  Teachers who retire before 65 years of age with less than 20 years of experience cannot 
cash in any of their sick days.  For leaves due to illness over 10 days, teachers must apply for a personal illness 
leave.     
27 Unfortunately, I do not have additional detail such as whether the teacher notified the principal ahead of time, or 
simply did not show up in school. 22 
failed at least one certification exam in the past, and 28 percent had never passed a certification 
exam.
28  Columns 2-7 present statistics separately for temporary, probationary and tenured 
teachers in pre- and post-reform years.  Prior to the introduction of the dismissal policy, the 
average number of absences was roughly comparable across groups, although a slightly higher 
fraction of temporary teachers had at least 15 absences per year.  Most interestingly, one sees 
that the number of absences drop by over 1 day per year (roughly 12 percent) for temporary and 
probationary teachers, but decrease by less than half that amount among tenured teachers.  These 
descriptive statistics thus provide the first indication that the new dismissal policy may have 
impacted teacher effort.   
 
6. Results  
  I begin by showing the unadjusted trends of teacher absences by job status.  Figure 1a 
shows the trends in absences from 2003 through 2007 separately for tenured and untenured 
teachers.  The two groups appear to have roughly comparable absence rates in 2003 and 2004, 
with the average teacher being absent a little more than 8 times during a year. Starting in 2005, 
absences within both groups decline, but the change is noticeably larger among untenured 
teachers. Trends in the fraction of “high-absence teachers” (i.e., teachers who are absent at least 
15 times during a year), shown in Figure 1b, tell a similar story.  Figures 2 and 3 present the 
analogous trends for elementary and high school teachers respectively.  In general, the patterns 
are similar, though it appears that the impact of the dismissal policy was somewhat larger among 
elementary school teachers.    
                                                 
28 The group that has never passed a certification exam mainly includes older teachers who were grandfathered into 
the existing certification regime.  23 
Table 4 presents baseline results from equation (1), which includes school, calendar year 
and experience year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered by school.  The results shown in 
column 1 imply that the dismissal policy reduced absences among probationary (temporary) 
teachers by roughly .71 (.95), which corresponds to a reduction of roughly 8-10 percent of the 
pre-reform mean.
29   
Columns 2-4 show estimates for several other potentially interesting absence measures.  
In order to measure the impact of the policy on the incidence of serious shirking, column 2 
focuses on the likelihood that a teacher was absent at least 15 days in the year, which 
corresponds with the 75
th percentile of the absence distribution.  Results are comparable using 
10+ and 20+ absences.  The estimates suggest that the policy reduced the incidence of such 
frequent absences by 2.2 percentage points (16 percent) and 4.9 percentage points (30 percent) 
among probationary and temporary teachers respectively.  Because prior literature has suggested 
that Friday absences are more indicative of shirking than absences on other days, columns 3 and 
4 focus exclusively on Friday absences.  The results are largely the same.   
While the point estimates for temporary teachers are slightly larger than those for 
probationary teachers, in all but one outcome (15+ absences), the effects on the two groups are 
not statistically different.  Hence, for the sake of parsimony, subsequent tables present results 
that combine probationary and temporary teachers.  Columns 5-8 show these baseline estimates 
for all untenured teachers (i.e., probationary and temporary) combined.  
 
6.1 Sensitivity analyses 
The results shown above suggest that the introduction of the dismissal policy led to a 
modest reduction in teacher absences.  However, this inference depends on a variety of 
                                                 
29 This is equivalent to an effect size of roughly the same size. 24 
assumptions.  Perhaps most importantly, I assume that there were no other explicit policies or 
other unobserved factors that would have affected tenured and untenured teachers differentially 
starting in 2005. In the context of the Chicago policy, one might be particularly concerned about 
factors that were changing either the composition or incentives of new/younger teachers in 
Chicago.  
Based on a review of CPS policies during this time and informal conversations with 
district administrators, it does not appear that there were any other programs that one would have 
expected to influence outcomes such as teacher absenteeism differentially by job status (though 
there were clearly a number of policies aimed at reforming low-performing schools, particularly 
at the secondary level).  While it is not possible to reliably judge prior trends based only two 
years of data, Figures 1-3 do not reveal any substantial differences between probationary and 
tenured teachers in the levels or changes in absences.  
In addition, a particular feature of the policy implementation provides a further test of 
this assumption.  As described in the data section, before the introduction of the non-renewal 
policy, there was a category of teachers who were fully credentialed, but not formally appointed 
to a position (i.e., not on the “tenure track”).  When the policy was implemented in 2004-05, all 
of these teachers were formally appointed and became first-year probationary teachers regardless 
of the number of years they had been working in the CPS.  This effectively breaks the link 
between teacher experience and probationary status, allowing one to assess whether the 
purported policy effects are driven simply by changes among novice teachers.
30  
                                                 
30 Even in the absence of this feature, there would have been some variation between teacher experience and job 
status because the experience variables in the CPS files correspond with when the teacher began working in the 
district in any capacity.  A non-trivial fraction of teachers start in temporary or non-teaching positions, and then 
transition into standard teacher roles.  In addition, some teachers that transfer from other districts can start in a 
higher job status. 25 
Figures 4a and 4b show the trends in absences separately for teachers less than five years 
of experience (tenure is earned after four years of service) and teachers with five or more years 
of service (using the same samples as in Figures 1a and 1b).  If one thought that unobserved prior 
trends or concurrent policies most relevant for younger teachers were driving the apparent policy 
impact, then one would expect the trends in Figure 4 to resemble those in Figure 1.  However, 
the new figures show a very different picture.  Comparing the older versus younger teachers, I 
see that the novice group has substantially fewer absences than more experienced teachers in all 
years but the trends among the groups are nearly identical.  This suggests that the results above 
are not simply an artifact of some other unobserved phenomenon that disproportionately 
influenced novice teachers in Chicago over this period.  Column 9 in Table 4 shows estimates 
that mirror Figures 4a – namely, our baseline specification but where the treatment group is 
defined as teachers with less than five years of experience.  Consistent with Figure 4a, there is no 
treatment effect in this specification.  Figures 5 and 6 present comparable trends separately for 
elementary and high schools, revealing a similar pattern across the grade levels. 
The model also assumes that the policy was unanticipated.  If teachers were aware of the 
impending changes during 2003-04, for example, then they may have altered their behavior in 
ways that would bias the estimate (e.g., young teachers may have worked harder in an effort to 
avoid dismissal in the following years, which would lead one to underestimate any productivity 
improvements).  My conversations with district administrators responsible for negotiating the 
new collective bargaining agreement in 2004 suggest that neither teachers nor administrators 
were aware of this policy until close to the time of ratification in July 2004.  
 A common concern in this type of analysis involves selective attrition.  For example, one 
might be concerned that the introduction of the policy led certain teachers to leave the system, or 26 
discouraged other teachers from accepting jobs in the CPS.  In this context, however, attrition 
should be considered a legitimate compositional effect of the policy.  As discussed above, while 
it is quite difficult to cleanly distinguish between incentive and composition effects in our 
analysis, I later present some results by calendar and risk year that speak to this issue.  
Finally, the analysis assumes that there are no productivity spillovers between eligible 
and ineligible teachers.  If, for example, greater effort on the part of probationary teachers 
induced greater effort on the part of tenured teachers in a school, the DD estimate would tend to 
understate any positive impact of the policy.  While it is possible that such spillovers exist, the 
contention here is that these effects are likely to be small.  
Table 5 shows that the main results described above are robust to a variety of alternative 
specifications.   Rows 2-4 show the results are roughly comparable regardless of whether one 
measures absences using sick days, personal days or other absences. Row 5 shows that the 
results fall but are still significant if one excludes observations with more than 40 absences, 
under the assumption that these are cases of non-discretionary leaves for illness or other reasons. 
Row 6 shows nearly identical results using only absences between September and March, prior 
to the time when teachers may have heard they had been non-renewed.   Row 7 shows that the 
results are robust to limiting the control group to include only young (i.e., teachers with 5-10 
years of experience) tenured teachers.   
Rows 8-9 present results separately using pre-policy assigned and unassigned 
probationary teachers respectively.  In doing so, we limit the analysis to probationary teachers 
who were in the CPS in 2004 since teachers hired after this year were automatically assigned.  
When we limit the comparison group to the roughly 23 percent of pre-policy PATs who were not 
assigned to positions, the dismissal policy does not appear to impact teacher effort.  It turns out 27 
that this is driven by the fact that these unassigned probationary teachers were more productive 
(i.e., had fewer absences, conditional on all other observables) than the assigned probationary 
teachers prior to the policy.  This is consistent with fact that unassigned teachers had less job 
security than assigned teachers prior to the policy, and may have been exerting greater effort in 
the absence of the policy.   
Rows 10-13 show that the results are not particularly sensitive to the inclusion of school 
fixed effects, school-year characteristics or teacher demographics.  Finally, in results not 
reported here but available upon request, I demonstrate that alternative estimates of the standard 
errors do not have an important effect on the inferences one would draw from the results, 
including clustering on teacher or experience instead of school as well as a two-way clustering of 
school and experience or teacher and school.  
 
6.2 Treatment effect heterogeneity 
Table 6 shows how the effect of the policy varies by school characteristics.  The first 
thing to see is that the impact was roughly 2.5 times larger in elementary schools than in high 
schools.  Moreover, there was significantly more variation in the policy effect across high 
schools than across elementary schools.  In elementary schools, for example, the impacts were 
roughly equivalent in higher- and lower-performing schools (columns 2-3) and across 
predominantly Hispanic, predominantly African-American and racially mixed elementary 
schools (columns 4-6).  In high schools, by contrast, the effects were concentrated in low-
achieving and predominantly African-American schools.  In results not reported here, I find that 
the policy effects in high schools (but not elementary schools) were concentrated in schools with 
younger principals (i.e., under the age of 50).  28 
It is also possible that the policy effect may have varied with the fraction of teachers in 
the school who were probationary, and thus subject to the new policy.  For example, the policy 
may have been more salient in schools with a large fraction of probationary teachers.  To 
examine this, columns 7-9 show results separately for schools by fraction probationary terciles.  
For elementary schools, we find no significant differences across subgroup. In high schools, we 
find the largest effects in the top and bottom terciles, although the differences are not statistically 
significant.  
Table 7 shows results separately for various teacher subgroups.  Interestingly, the policy 
seems to have had a significantly higher impact on younger and female teachers relative to older 
and male teachers.  Given that females had higher rates of absenteeism prior to the introduction 
of the policy, it may be the case that the policy reduced absences among those at highest risk of 
absenteeism.  To explore this more formally, I predict absence rates based on observable teacher, 
principal and school characteristics using the pre-reform data, and then estimate the policy 
effects separately for the top, middle and bottom third of the predicted teacher absence 
distribution.  As expected, the policy had a significantly larger impact on teachers with 
moderate- and high-predicted absences relative to those with low predicted absences.  In high 
schools, it appears that the impacts were concentrated primarily among Black teachers.  In results 
not reported here, I confirm that this is not simply because Black teachers disproportionately 
work in low-achieving high schools that experienced the largest policy effects.  
Table 8 examines whether the policy effect varies with the likelihood of dismissal.  Given 
that only 10-12 percent of probationary teachers were dismissed under this policy and that 30-40 
percent of schools did not dismiss any teachers, many teachers may have perceived little risk of 
dismissal.  For these teachers, one would not expect the policy to have had any substantial 29 
impact. To explore this potential heterogeneity, I calculate the predicted probability of dismissal 
for each teacher using a rich set of observable teacher, school and principal characteristics.
31  
Because actual dismissal is potentially endogenous with respect to teacher behavior, it is 
important that the characteristics one uses in the prediction equation include only pre-determined 
characteristics and not, for example, teacher absences in the year of dismissal. 
Columns 1-4 present the policy effects separately by quartile of this predicted 
probability.
32  Elementary teachers in the top quartile (i.e., those most likely to be dismissed) 
appear to have responded somewhat more than other elementary teachers, although the point 
estimates are not statistically different across quartiles. The estimates for high school teachers are 




                                                 
31 To do so, I estimate a Conditional Logit model including all probationary teachers in 2005-2007 where the 
outcome is a binary indicator for whether the teacher was dismissed.  In addition to a full set of school x year 
effects, predictors all include a rich set of teacher, school and principal characteristics (including all of those shown 
in Table 3). While the school and principal characteristics are not identified in light of the inclusion of school x year 
fixed effects, I include a number of interactions between teacher characteristics and school/principal characteristics 
that are identified and were found to be predictive of dismissal in previous work (Jacob 2007).  I use the coefficients 
from this model to calculate a predicted probability of dismissal for all teachers in both pre- and post-policy years.  
The fixed effects are not included in the prediction since these would capture the unobserved, ex-post propensities to 
dismiss teachers at the school, which may be endogenous to teacher behavior as discussed above. These predictions 
capture the within-school probability of dismissal, which is consistent with the school fixed effect approach used in 
identifying the policy effect.  Finally, it is worth noting that ideally one would use pre-policy data to calculate 
dismissal probabilities.  Unfortunately, virtually no teachers were dismissed prior to this policy (as least as shown in 
the formal administrative data), which makes this approach infeasible. 
32 When one examines policy effects by predicted probability of dismissal, one must assume that the predicted 
probability of dismissal corresponds with a teacher’s perception of the likely risk of dismissal. 
33 In results not reported here, I examine whether the policy effects differed by the aggregate school dismissal rates.   
While ex-post dismissal is clearly endogenous to teacher behavior (as discussed above), school-level splits by broad 
categories could be interesting if, for example, schools in which no teachers were dismissed were not sufficiently 
aware of the policy or had other circumstances that might have obviated the need for the policy.  For elementary 
schools, I found only modest size and statistically insignificant differences across groups.  In high schools, by 
contrast, the policy effects seem to be concentrated in schools the 15% of schools that did not dismiss any teachers. 
The results here are consistent with a scenario in which teachers respond to the incentives provided by the policy, 
adjust their behavior accordingly, and thereby avoid dismissal.  This dynamic would introduce a negative correlation 
between changes in teacher effort and ex-post dismissal rates. 30 
Table 9 presents specifications that allow the policy effect to differ by calendar and risk 
year, as both the incentive and composition components of the policy might vary along these 
dimensions.  Incentive effects may vary with calendar year as teachers and principals become 
more familiar with the policy.  The compositional effects of the policy will obviously differ by 
calendar year.  Probationary teachers in 2004-05, for example, will not have been hired under the 
new regime, and could not have been dismissed yet, so there should be no compositional effect.   
Risk year is defined as the number of years a probationary/temporary teacher has worked 
in a particular school under the new regime. Prior to the policy, all teachers have a value of zero.  
In 2005, all PATs and TATs are coded as risk year equals one.  In 2006, newly hired teachers 
will have a value of 1 and teachers who “survived” dismissal in 2005 and remained at the same 
school are coded as having risk year equal to two.  PATs/TATs who switched schools within the 
district between 2005 and 2006 are coded as risk year one again in 2006 because of prior 
literature suggesting that firm-specific tenure (as opposed to simply experience) is critical aspect 
of job security.  
A variety of models of employer learning imply that the incentives might diminish with 
time spent at a particular school under the new regime (e.g., Jovanovic 1978).  Intuitively, having 
“survived” one or more years without being dismissed, a teacher may feel reassured that the 
principal thinks highly of her.  However, risk year will also incorporate compositional effects 
since, by definition, teachers with higher values will have  “survived” dismissal in the past, and 
might therefore be positively selected. 
Because risk year and calendar year are highly correlated, I estimate a parsimonious 
specification that simply adds two interaction terms to the baseline specification. The key 
independent variable in the baseline specification is Post Policy x Untenured Teacher.  Here I 31 
include a variable allowing the policy to have a separate effect on teachers in their second or 
third year under the policy (i.e., Post Policy x Untenured Teacher x Risk year 2 or 3) and 
allowing the policy to have a separate effect in the second and third years of the policy (i.e., Post 
Policy x Untenured Teacher x School year 2006 or 2007).  
To begin, consider column 1 in panel A.  The estimate of -0.713 reflects the impact of the 
policy in calendar year 2005 (which incorporates, by construction, only teachers with risk year 
1). The estimate in the second row of 0.24 indicates that the policy effect was somewhat smaller 
for teachers who had survived their first year of the policy (i.e., these teachers reduced absences 
by .71 - .24 = .47 per year as a result of the policy).  The estimates in the third row indicate that 
the effect of the policy was substantially larger in the later years of the policy.  Untenured 
teachers in 2006 and 2007 realized a reduction in absences of roughly 1.2 per year (.713 + .489) 
– an effect 70 percent larger than teachers in 2005.  It is important to recognize, however, that 
the differential effects for 2006 and 2007 reflect not only any change in incentives, but also 
compositional changes due to dismissals and new hiring.  The remaining columns show results 
from the same specification estimated on different subsamples of schools.  
 
6.3 Impacts on Student Achievement 
As noted earlier, the CPS data does not have the information necessary to link individual 
teachers to students over the analysis period, which precludes examining the impact of the policy 
on student achievement using the strategy described above.  Instead, I estimate a difference-in-
difference model at the school-year level, comparing within-school changes in student 
achievement over time between schools with higher versus lower fractions of probationary 
teachers at the time the policy was implemented.  The intuition behind this approach is that 32 
schools with a higher fraction of probationary teachers in 2005 experienced a larger “dose” of 
the treatment.  For example, if the policy induces effort among teachers at risk of dismissal, then 
these schools should experience greater increases in effort, ceteris paribus.  Similarly, these 
schools have the potential to undergo greater turnover, thus realizing greater compositional 
changes.     
To illustrate the intuition behind this strategy, Figures 7 and 8 plot the standardized math 
and reading scores 2003 through 2007 separately for elementary schools with the highest and 
lowest fractions of probationary teachers in 2005. Looking first at all elementary schools in panel 
A, we see little evidence of differential achievement trends across the schools.  When we focus 
on low-achieving schools in Panel B, however, there is some evidence that schools with a high 
fraction of probationary teachers experienced more rapid growth in student achievement 
following the introduction of the dismissal policy, relative to schools with a lower share of 
probationary teachers.  
The trends in Figures 7 and 8 do not control for any student or teacher characteristics.  
One obvious concern with this strategy is that the fraction of probationary teachers in a school in 
2005 is likely correlated with other factors (both observable and unobservable) that might 
influence subsequent achievement.  To account for this, I estimate the following model: 
(2)    
where Yst  is a measure of student achievement in school s in year t.
34  The model includes (a) 
school fixed effects  (which control for any such time-invariant school characteristics that 
                                                 
34 The achievement measures used in this analysis come from the Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT), 
which was the primary standardized exam given to students in Illinois.  Because in the earlier years of the period the 
exam was only administered to students in grades 3, 5 and 8, we limit the analysis to these grades.  Specifically, we 
take the school-grade-year average scale scores, standardize these to have mean zero and standard deviation one, 33 
might be associated with initial teacher experience levels and subsequent student achievement 
such as a particularly dangerous neighborhood or aging school facilities), (b) time-varying 
student characteristics Zst and (c) time-varying measures of teacher experience, also included in 
Zst.
35  The teacher experience measures are important because of the well-established experience-
effectiveness gradient in teaching, coupled with the fact that schools with more probationary 
teachers in 2005 will, by definition, have more teachers progressing through their early teaching 
years over the period.  In addition, I control for an interaction between the fraction low-income 
in 2005 and a post-policy indicator to account for the fact that schools with a disproportionate 
number of probationary teachers also have a more disadvantaged student population, and 
achievement may have changed in low-income schools for reasons unrelated to the dismissal 
policy. The coefficient on the interaction between post and %PAT05,  , measures the 
achievement effect of the policy.
36   
Table 10 shows estimates corresponding to equation (2).  Columns 1-3 present the 
coefficients on the interaction between a post-policy indicator and the fraction of teachers in the 
school in 2004-05 that was probationary.  The regressions are weighted by student enrollment, 
and standard errors are clustered by school.  The top panel shows results using the school 
average scale score in math as the outcome, standardized using the standard deviation in school 
                                                                                                                                                             
and then create an average standardized measure for each school-year weighting by the number of students tested in 
a particular school-grade-year.  For the proficiency outcomes, we simply use the weighted average of the fraction 
proficient (or higher) in the school-year, again weighting by the number of tested students in each school-grade-
year.      
35 Time-varying covariates include fraction Black, fraction Hispanic, fraction eligible for free lunch, teacher 
experience and its square and the fraction of teachers with less than 3 years of experience. 
36 In order for this strategy to provide reliable results, there must be substantial variation in the school fraction of 
probationary teachers across schools that have similar poverty and/or achievement levels.  Fortunately, this appears 
to be the case.  For elementary schools, the mean within school percent probationary (untenured) teachers in 2005 
was 33% (43%), the 90th percentile was 50% (65%) and the 10th percentile was 19% (26%). Importantly, the 
fraction untenured in a school in 2005 was only modestly correlated with student demographics (correlation of .2 
with fraction eligible for free-lunch) and student achievement (correlation of -.29 with fraction meeting proficiency 
standard).  This suggests that there will be substantial variation in probationary status that is not correlated with 
other observable school characteristics to allow independent identification of   and   above. 34 
mean scores (as opposed to the student-level standard deviation).  The point estimate of .127 
(column 1) is not statistically significant.  However, it is worth noting that the implied effect is 
quite large.  Given that the student standard deviations are roughly double the standard deviation 
in school means, if we assume zero spillovers from probationary to tenured teachers, these 
results suggest an effect size of roughly .25 student standard deviations among “treated” (i.e., 
probationary) teachers.  Equivalently, the point estimates suggest that a 30-percentage point 
increase in the fraction of probationary teachers at the school would be associated with an 
increase in student achievement of .3 x .25 ~ .08 standard deviations.      
Looking at low- and high-achieving elementary schools in columns 2 and 3 respectively, 
we see that the point estimates for low-achieving schools are roughly double those in high-
achieving schools.  None of the estimates, however, is statistically different than zero.  The 
pattern of results for fraction of students scoring at or above the proficient level, shown in the 
second panel, is roughly comparable as are the findings for reading, shown in panels 3 and 4.    
As discussed earlier, it appears that the policy increased effort among temporary teachers 
as well as probationary teachers, in which case one might want to use the fraction of teachers in a 
school who were untenured (i.e., probationary or temporary) as the measure of treatment.  The 
specifications shown in columns 4-6 do exactly this, estimating equation (2) where fraction 
untenured is substituted for fraction probationary.  The results are qualitatively similar to those in 
columns 1-3, but somewhat larger and a bit more precisely estimated such that some of the 
estimates for low-achieving schools are significantly different than zero at conventional levels.
37 
Overall, these results provide only tentative evidence that the policy increased student 
achievement scores in elementary schools.  However, as noted earlier, the point estimates 
                                                 
37 None of the estimates presented here is sensitive to the student enrollment weighting or to the use of the natural 
logarithm of achievement (or the log odds of fraction proficient) as the outcome. 35 
suggest potentially large effects. Moreover, based on prior estimates of the relationship between 
teacher absences and student achievement, it appears that the observed decline in teacher 
absences can only explain a tiny fraction of the teacher effort response.
38  In high schools, by 
contrast, I find no evidence that the policy influenced student achievement, consistent with the 
much smaller effects on teacher absences in this level (results available upon request).  
   
7.  Conclusions 
In this paper, I take advantage of a unique policy change in the Chicago Public Schools 
(CPS) to estimate the effect of employment protection on worker effort.  My results suggest that 
the reduction of job security for probationary teachers in Chicago led to a 10-20 percent 
reduction in teacher absenteeism.  The effects were strongest among teachers in elementary 
schools and in low-achieving, predominantly African-American high schools, and among 
teachers with high-predicted absences. 
This study makes several important contributions.  First, it informs the economic 
literatures on employment protection policies and teacher incentives.  To the best of my 
knowledge, it is one of the few empirical studies of the impact of employment protection on 
worker effort, and the only study to directly examine this issue in the public sector (let alone in 
education).  Second, the findings presented here have important implications for current 
                                                 
38  If one estimates equation (2) using teacher absences at the outcome, one finds that a 30-percentage point increase 
in fraction untenured is associated with 0.7 x 0.3 = 0.21 fewer absences.  Prior research suggests that a reduction of 
1 teacher absence increases student achievement by about 0.002 student standard deviations (Clotfelter et al. 2007, 
Miller et al. 2007).  Hence if achievement were operating solely through reduced teacher absence, then one would 
expect a 30-percentage point increase in the fraction untenured to result in a 0.21 x 0.002 =  0.00042 student 
standard deviation gain in achievement. The estimates in Table 10 are measured in terms of school-level standard 
deviations, which are roughly half the size of the student-level standard deviation in Chicago elementary schools 
during this period.  For example, in 2006, the student s.d. of reading scores in grades 3, 5 and 8 was roughly 29, 28 
and 23 compared with the school s.d. of 13, 13 and 10.   In math, the corresponding figures are 29, 27 and 26 
compared with 15, 14 and 13.  Hence, the point estimate of 0.195 school-level s.d. in column 4 of the top panel 
corresponds to an effect of 0.195 x 2 = 0.39.  A 30 pp effect would be 0.3 x 0.39 = 0.117.  Hence, teacher absences 
can only explain roughly 0.00042 / 0.117 = 0.004, less than 1 percent, of the effect of the policy. 36 
education policy debates.  Specifically, the decline in teacher absenteeism following the 
introduction of the policy provides the most compelling evidence to date that changes in teacher 
contract provisions can improve student. 
At the same time, the apparent reluctance of many principals to utilize the additional 
flexibility granted under the new contract in Chicago speaks to the potential importance of 
teacher supply and/or social norms governing employment relations in schools.  This suggests 
that contractual changes alone will not be sufficient to change the practice of promotion and 
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rTable 3 - Summary Statistics for Analysis Sample
Pre-Policy (2003-2004) Post-Policy (2005-2007)
TAT PAT Tenured TAT PAT Tenured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Teacher Productivity
Number of absences  8.386 8.707 8.83 8.84 7.282 7.758 8.417
At least 15 absences  0.123 0.159 0.139 0.135 0.092 0.102 0.12
Number of Friday absences 2.179 2.197 2.27 2.297 1.932 2.029 2.192
At least 3 Friday absences 0.215 0.228 0.225 0.231 0.176 0.195 0.216
Teacher Characteristics
Male 0.226 0.283 0.234 0.207 0.312 0.239 0.204
Black 0.346 0.294 0.327 0.401 0.216 0.275 0.387
Hispanic 0.14 0.235 0.137 0.11 0.225 0.158 0.121
White 0.475 0.426 0.493 0.462 0.503 0.51 0.461
Age  43.939 37.247 39.301 48.779 35.702 35.963 49.458
Years of experience 12.546 4.718 8.341 17.283 4.278 5.178 17.795
Teaching in the same school last year 0.187 0.44 0.274 0.069 0.48 0.301 0.081
MA+  0.504 0.229 0.324 0.572 0.341 0.45 0.623
Education Major 0.513 0.308 0.41 0.59 0.309 0.444 0.604
2.011 1.758 1.909 1.948 2.198 2.181 1.997
Failed at least one test 0.156 0.294 0.189 0.085 0.256 0.226 0.111
Has not passed any tests 0.281 0.164 0.184 0.456 0.153 0.052 0.374
School Characteristics
0.462 0.374 0.4 0.423 0.452 0.478 0.516
0.848 0.877 0.85 0.837 0.867 0.856 0.842
Percent of students who are Black 0.49 0.548 0.512 0.484 0.508 0.503 0.467
Percent of students who are Hispanic 0.375 0.36 0.364 0.372 0.381 0.369 0.385
Principal male 0.377 0.353 0.376 0.38 0.386 0.375 0.379
Principal Black 0.473 0.539 0.488 0.461 0.495 0.489 0.453
Principal White 0.349 0.261 0.337 0.384 0.285 0.32 0.372
Principal Hispanic 0.166 0.188 0.166 0.146 0.201 0.177 0.164
Principal age 54.282 54.133 54.435 54.685 53.711 53.837 54.347
Principal B.A. in Education 0.593 0.563 0.571 0.575 0.591 0.598 0.614
2.025 1.913 1.944 1.943 2.093 2.063 2.09
Number of teachers 33,600 4,636 8,534 14,238 3,876 12,670 16,666
Number of teacher-year observations 117,420 6,357 14,065 27,102 6,178 24,010 39,708
All  
Teachers
College quality (1=lowest to  
5=highest)
Percent of students meeting national  
norms or achieving proficiency
Percent of students eligible for free  
lunch
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 5 – Robustness
Dependent Variable: Number of Absences
Untenured
(1) Baseline 116970 8.386 -0.806** 1.224**
(7.788) (0.103) (0.124)
(2) Dependent variable = sick days only 116970 6.479 -0.435** 0.743**
(6.572) (0.084) (0.105)
(3) Dependent variable = personal days only 116970 1.262 -0.075** 0.047**
(1.236) (0.015) (0.016)
(4) Dependent variable = other absences only 116970 0.645 -0.297** 0.434**
(2.931) (0.045) (0.052)
(5) 115826 7.921 -0.464** 0.728**
(6.023) (0.078) (0.084)
(6) Dependent variable = September-March absences 116970 5.582 -0.717** 0.863**
(6.139) (0.078) (0.096)
(7) Only young tenured teachers in control group 66018 8.302 -0.551** 0.541**
(7.743) (0.157) (0.160)
(8) 85185 8.636 -0.962** 1.413**
(8.041) (0.147) (0.165)
(9) 70176 8.541 0.251 0.039
(7.724) (0.257) (0.280)
(10) No school fixed effects 116970 8.386 -0.763** 1.389**
(7.788) (0.102) (0.125)
(11) Teacher demographics and no school fixed effects 116970 8.386 -0.651** 1.138**
(7.788) (0.105) (0.127)
(12) 116970 8.386 -0.695** 1.052**
(7.788) (0.105) (0.127)
(13) Teacher demographics with school fixed effects 116970 8.386 -0.713** 1.041**
(7.788) (0.106) (0.126)
Number of  
Observations
Mean (s.d.) of  
Dependent  
Variable
Post Policy x  
Untenured
Dependent variable = total number of absences,  
excluding outliers (>40)
Only non-temporary teachers observed in 2004, only  
assigned probationary teachers in treatment group
Only non-temporary teachers observed in 2004, only  
unassigned probationary teachers in treatment group
Teacher and school demographics and no school fixed  
effects
Notes: Each row represents a different regression.  Regressions include school fixed effects, except where indicated  
otherwise.  All regressions include a full set of fixed effects for academic year and years of teaching experience.  
Regressions with teacher demographics include race and gender dummies, race x gender interactions, teacher educational  
background controls, instructional program indicators, a cubic in age, and gender x age interactions.  Regressions with  
school demographics include student race proportion variables, a cubic in school achievement, a cubic in school  
enrollment, an indicator for magnet schools, and an indicator for having multiple schools housed in the same building.  





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 8 – Impact of the Dismissal Policy by Predicted Probability of Dismissal
Dependent Variable: Number of Absences
Quartile of Predicted Probability of Dismissal:
Bottom Second Third Top
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Elementary Schools
Post Policy x Untenured Teacher -0.693** -0.879** -0.557** -1.089**
(0.282) (0.257) (0.253) (0.305)
Mean of Dependent Variable 8.904 8.490 8.254 8.311
Standard Deviation of Dependent Variable 8.237 7.783 7.627 8.689
Number of Observations 18562 18562 18559 18566
Panel B: High Schools
Post Policy x Untenured Teacher -0.429 -0.498 -0.513 0.191
(0.330) (0.358) (0.360) (0.412)
Mean of Dependent Variable 8.065 8.508 8.308 8.210
Standard Deviation of Dependent Variable 6.319 7.031 6.963 7.986
Number of Observations 7556 7556 7556 7556
Notes: Each column represents a different regression.  All regressions include a full set of fixed  
effects for school, academic year, and years of teaching experience.  Standard errors clustered by  
school in parentheses.  Predicted probability of dismissal is estimated from a conditional logit of  
dismissal on teacher demographics and teacher-school interactions conditional on school-year fixed  
effects (the fixed effects are not included in the prediction).  All probationary teachers in 2005-2007  
in school-years that dismissed at least one teacher are included in the conditional logit regression and  
probabilities of dismissal are predicted in and out of sample for all teachers.  * significant at 10%; **  
significant at 5%.Table 9 – Effects by Calendar Year and Risk Year
Dependent Variable = Number of Absences
Full sample
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Elementary Schools






Mean of Dependent Variable 8.446 9.004 7.990
8.067 8.209 7.922
Number of Observations 82957 37686 44743
Number of Schools 488 239 240
Panel B: High Schools






Mean of Dependent Variable 8.237 8.995 7.916
7.059 7.637 6.768
Number of Observations 34013 11011 22330







Post Policy x Untenured Teacher x  
(Risk year 2 or 3)
Post Policy x Untenured Teacher x  
(School year 2006 or 2007)
Standard Deviation of Dependent  
Variable
Post Policy x Untenured Teacher x  
(Risk year 2 or 3)
Post Policy x Untenured Teacher x  
(School year 2006 or 2007)
Standard Deviation of Dependent  
Variable
Notes: Each column represents a different regression.  All regressions include a full  
set of fixed effects for school, academic year, and years of teaching experience.    
Low (high) achieving schools are schools with below (above) mean fraction of  
students proficient on the ISAT in elementary schools and the PSAE in high schools  
over the three pre-policy years (2002-2004).  Standard errors clustered by school in  
parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.Table 10 – Impact of the Dismissal Policy on School Level Student Achievement in Elementary Schools
At Risk of Dismissal = At Risk of Dismissal =
Probationary Teachers Untenured Teachers
All All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable = Math Scaled Scores
0.127 0.160 0.081 0.195 0.241* 0.121
(0.132) (0.157) (0.210) (0.119) (0.140) (0.192)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.042 -0.666 0.719 0.042 -0.666 0.719
Dependent Variable = Math Fraction Proficient
0.022 0.041 -0.007 0.051* 0.080** 0.009
(0.034) (0.041) (0.049) (0.030) (0.037) (0.044)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.540 0.394 0.680 0.540 0.394 0.680
Dependent Variable = Reading Scaled Scores
0.119 0.277* -0.064 0.181 0.316** 0.020
(0.124) (0.166) (0.165) (0.111) (0.143) (0.151)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.046 -0.669 0.730 0.046 -0.669 0.730
Dependent Variable = Reading Fraction Proficient
0.037 0.046 0.019 0.052** 0.066** 0.028
(0.028) (0.038) (0.036) (0.024) (0.033) (0.032)













Post Policy x Fraction Teachers at  
Risk of Dismissal in 2005
Post Policy x Fraction Teachers at  
Risk of Dismissal in 2005
Post Policy x Fraction Teachers at  
Risk of Dismissal in 2005
Post Policy x Fraction Teachers at  
Risk of Dismissal in 2005
Notes: Each cell represents a different school-year level regression with the indicated dependent variable.  
Standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  The elementary school assessment is the math and  
reading ISAT taken in grades 3, 5, and 8.  Scaled scores are standardized at the school level within grade-
subject-year to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.  All assessment outcomes represent an enrollment  
weighted average across grades within school-year.  All regressions include controls for the fraction of low  
income students in the school year, fraction of low income students x post policy, mean level of teaching  
experience in the school-year, mean experience squared, the fraction of first or second year teachers in the  
school-year, other school demographics, indicators for whether the assessment is observed in each grade, the  
fraction of enrolled students in the grade taking the exam, and a full set of fixed effects for school and  
academic year.  Low (high) achieving schools are schools with below (above) mean fraction of students  
proficient on the ISAT over the three pre-policy years (2002-2004).  For elementary schools, the mean within  
school percent probationary (untenured) teachers in 2005 was 33% (43%), the 90th percentile was 50% (65%)  
and the 10th percentile was 19% (26%).  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.  